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Too Sophisticated for Your Own Good:
Missouri, Sophisticated Parties and.., the
Economic Loss Rule?
Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcrafi, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Purcell Tire and Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., the Missouri
Supreme Court held that the "express negligence" rule2 is inapplicable to liability
limitations in contracts between sophisticated parties with claims of purely
economic losses.3 Although the decision does not explicitly determine whether
the case presented a contract or tort claim, the result clearly follows from the
treatment of the case as a pure contract action. Consequently, the decision
parallels the typical result reached under the application of the more well-known
"economic loss rule"4 and appropriately preserves the fundamental distinctions
between contract and tort law in cases involving sophisticated parties.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Purcell involved a breach of contract claim based on the allegedly
negligent performance of an airplane inspection.' Before closing on the
purchase of a used Beechjet 400 airplane, Purcell Tire and Rubber Company
("Purcell") contacted Executive Beechcraft, Inc. ("Beechcraft") about
performing an inspection of the airplane.6 In response, Beechcraft faxed a three-
page Aircraft Pre-Purchase Survey contract to Purcell.7 Every provision of the
contract appeared in eleven point font on the front side of each page.' The initial
contract provisions stated that the survey did not assure the aircraft's
airworthiness nor did it provide any express or implied warranties about the
aircraft's condition or the remaining useful life of it or its components.9 Over the
1. 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2001).
2. The rule states that enforceable negligence liability limitations require use of the
terms "'negligence,' or 'fault' or their equivalents so that a clear and unmistakable waiver
occur[s]." Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Mo. 1996).
3. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 510-11.
4. See infra Part V.




9. Id. The contract's first paragraph stated:
AIRCRAFT PRE-PURCHASE SURVEY
The following is a list of items that will be checked in order to complete an
1
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next two pages the contract then listed the items on the aircraft to be surveyed.'0
After listing these items, the contract provided a pre-purchase pricing schedule
indicating a cost of $1,250 for the described survey of the aircraft Purcell was
considering. " Finally, directly above the signature line, the last paragraph of the
contract stated:
It is expressly agreed that the liability, if any, of Executive Beechcraft,
Inc. under this agreement shall be limited to the cost of services
performed hereunder. All parties to this agreement expressly agree to
indemnify and hold harmless Executive Beechcraft, Inc. from any
damages or expenses claimed by any part [sic] to this agreement
beyond the cost of the services performed hereunder. 2
Purcell's president read the agreement, signed it, and faxed it back to
Beechcraft without requesting any changes in the contract.' Beechcraft then
performed the survey, prepared a report, and discussed the findings with
Purcell. 4 Purcell then proceeded to purchase the aircraft for $2,080,000.
Within a few months of purchase, however, Purcell discovered an oil leak in the
plane that caused extensive damage. ' 6 Beechcraft never made any mention of
an oil leak to Purcell in the survey or otherwise. 7
Purcell then sued Beechcraft in Clay County Circuit Court on breach of
contract and negligence claims, seeking damages of $372,458." The circuit
court granted Beechcraft's motion for summary judgment and ruled that the
Aircraft Pre-Purchase Survey. This survey is a statement of aircraft condition
at that time. It is NOT however, a statement of airworthiness.
Executive Beechcraft makes no guarantee or warranty, either express or
implied, concerning the condition or the remaining useful life of the aircraft,
it's [sic] systems, avionics or other installed equipment.
If the items listed below do not meet your needs for a pre-purchase survey,
Executive Beechcraft, Inc. will be happy to perform an inspection in
accordance with the manufacturers inspection programs or Federal Aviation
Administration FAR's.
Id. (alteration in original).
10. Id. at 508.
11. Id.
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contract limited liability to the $1,250 contract price of the survey. " Purcell then
appealed this decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
and the Missouri Supreme Court ordered the appeal transferred.2"
On appeal, Purcell argued that contract provisions that limit liability for acts
of negligence violate public policy and that Schaffer v. Property Evaluations,
Inc."' and Weindel v. DeSoto Rural Fire Protection Ass 'nEE mandate that such
liability limitations are only enforceable if "bargained for." 3 Purcell contended
that because no specific negotiations over the liability limitation in question
occurred, it was not "bargained for" or enforceable.24
In a unanimous decision, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected Purcell's
argument and found the liability limitation enforceable.2" Citing Alack v. Vic
Tanny International of Missouri, Inc.,26 the court reaffirmed that "[c]lear,
unambiguous, unmistakable and conspicuous limitations of negligence liability
do not violate public policy," and to the extent they imply that parties only agree
to terms specifically negotiated over, the court held that Weindel and Schaffer
should no longer be followed.27
IH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Negligence Liability Limitations in General
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, parties may limit the
legal duties owed to each other through contract just as they may impose
additional duties on each other through contract.2" One such form of
modification, pre-injury negligence liability limitations, are neither uncommon
19. Id.
20. Id.; see also Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., No. WD
58041, 2000 WL 1744502 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2000), aff'd, 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo.
2001).
21. 854 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), abrogated by Purcell, 59 S.W.3d 505.
22. 765 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), abrogated by Purcell, 59 S.W.3d 505.
23. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 509.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 511. Judge Duane Benton wrote the opinion of the court, joined by Chief
Justice Stephen J. Limbaugh, Jr., and Judges John C. Holstien, Michael A. Wolff,
William J. Price, Jr., and Paul J. Simon (of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern
District, sitting specially). Judge Ronnie L. White concurred in a separate opinion,joined
by Judge Michael A. Wolff. Judge Laura Denver Stith did not participate.
26. 923 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. 1996).
27. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 509 (citing Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, top. 4, introductorynote (1979).
3
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nor per se void as violations of public policy.29 Section 195(2) of the
Restatement provides:
A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused
negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if(a) the term
exempts an employer from liability for injury in the course of his
employment; (b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public
service from liability to one whom that duty is owed for compensation
for breach of that duty, or (c) the other party is similarly a member of
a class protected against the class to which the first party belongs.3"
The Restatement explains, however, that the list provided is not intended to be
exhaustive and provides: "[i]f, for example, a statute imposes a standard of
conduct, a court may decide on the basis of an analysis of the statute, that a term
exempting a party from liability for failure to conform to that standard is
unenforceable."'"
Notwithstanding the Restatement provisions, courts often continue to
strictly construe contracts prospectively exempting a party from liability for
future negligent acts on two public policy grounds.32 First, public policyjustifies
heightened scrutiny because such contracts often constitute contracts of adhesion
between parties with unequal bargaining power.33  Second, if courts
unquestioningly enforced such limitations, they would amount to "a license to
be negligent." '34 Elaborating on this second point, the courts note that because
a primary purpose of the law is to furnish legal remedies for injuries received, an
agreement that essentially imposes a penalty for seeking such a remedy
undermines a fundamental objective of the law.35 These concerns have prompted
at least one jurisdiction to prohibit parties from contracting out of the common
law duty to exercise ordinary care.36 Most jurisdictions, however, reject such a
broad prohibition and reserve judicial discretion to enforce a negligence liability
limitation based upon whether or not it violates public policy under the particular
circumstances of each case.37
29. 57A AM. JUR. 2DNegligence § 49 (1989).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2)(a)-(c) (1979).
31. Id. § 195 cmt. a (1979).
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B. Negotiation and Consideration of Negligence Liability Limitations
in Missouri
In Weindel v. DeSoto Rural Fire Protection Association, Inc., . the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District considered the validity of negligence
liability limitations in the context of a negligence claim by a mobile home owner
against a volunteer rural fire protection association.39 The mobile home owner,
Weindel, purchased a $12.50 fire tag entitling Weindel's property to firefighting
services.4" Upon purchase, the mobile home owner received a metal fire tag to
place on the property and a signed receipt.4 After the mobile home burned
down due to the association's failure to provide firefighting services, Weindel
sought $17,500 in damages against the association." The association claimed
that Weindel could not pursue a damage claim because the back of the receipt
given to Weindel contained a provision preventing any suit by a tag holder.43
Citing the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Rock Springs Realty, Inc. v.
Waid," the Eastern District acknowledged that while agreements releasing one
party from the consequences of its own negligence do not per se violate public
policy, such a release or covenant not to sue requires its own separate
consideration.45 The court determined that the fire tag fee only served as
consideration for the association's promise to provide firefighting services.46
Therefore, the agreement to release the association from all contract or tort
claims lacked separate consideration.47 In addition to this finding, the court
stated: "[t]here can be no release unless there exists at the time of the claimed
release a bona fide controversy concerning [a] defendant's legal liability on
some issue in dispute between the parties."" Because no such controversy
existed when Weindel received the receipt and because the limitation provision
38. 765 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), abrogated by Purcell Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2001).
39. Id. at 713.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 714.
43. Id. at 715.
44. 392 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1965).
45. Weindel, 765 S.W.2d at 715 (citing Passer v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
577 S.W.2d 639, 648 (Mo. 1979); Lugena v. Hanna, 420 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Mo. 1967);
Gee v. Nieberg, 501 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 715-16 (quoting Aiple v. S. Side Nat'l Bank, 442 S.W.2d 145, 151 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
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was not supported by separate consideration, the court allowed Weindel to
recover against the association despite the negligence liability limitation.49
The Eastern District again confronted the issue of liability limitations in
contracts in Schaffer v. Property Evaluations, Inc.5" In Schaffer, homeowners
sought $15,000 in damages for a home inspector's failure to disclose a water
leakage problem.5 At the time of contract, the homeowners signed a standard
form inspection order agreement which limited the inspection company's liability
for post-inspection claims to the $153 inspection fee.52 The Eastern District
began its analysis in Schaffer by noting the similarity between the case before it
and Weindel.53 The court then determined that none of the contract provisions
were "bargained for," and that, absent any specific negotiation over the liability
limitation provision, that provision lacked separate consideration and could not
be enforced. 4
C. The Express Negligence Rule
The Missouri Supreme Court addressed the validity of negligence liability
limitation provisions in Alack v. Vic Tanny International of Missouri, Inc.55 In
A lack, a health club member brought a negligence claim against the health club
seeking $17,000 in damages for an injury he allegedly suffered while using a
piece of health club equipment.5 6 Upon joining the health club, the member
signed a two-page, seventeen paragraph contract containing what the court
characterized as "a general exculpatory clause" purporting to release the health
club from "any and all claims."" Because the clause was printed on the back of
the contract, the court determined that the limitation did not "conspicuously
stand out." 8 Further, the court concluded that the negligence liability limitation
did not insulate the health club from liability because it did not "use the word
'negligence' or 'fault' or their equivalents so that a clear and unmistakable
waiver occurred."59 This requirement has been referred to as the "express
negligence" rule.6" As a result of the failure to include this language, the court
49. Id. at 716.
50. 854 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), abrogated by Purcell Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2001).
51. Id. at 493-94.
52. Id. at 494.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 495.
55. 923 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. 1996).
56. Id. at 332.
57. Id. at 332-33.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 332.
60. See Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505,
[Vol. 68
6
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found the exculpatory clause was ambiguous and, therefore, unenforceable.6
The court did not, however, completely foreclose the ability to limit negligence
liability. The Alack court noted that, although traditional notions ofjustice seem
contrary to limitations on remedies, a party may avoid liability for its future
negligence by placing "clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous
language" to that effect in a contract.62 To be effective, the limitation provision
"must effectively notify" the other party that he or she is waiving the right to
pursue claims of negligence against the first party.63 The court did, however,
express a limitation on its holding: "This case does not involve an agreement
negotiated at arms length between sophisticated commercial entities. Less precise
language may be effective in such situations, and we reserve any such issues."64
D. Sophisticated Parties and the Freedom of Contract
Over the past several years, the Missouri Supreme Court has consistently
enforced freedom of contract by allowing sophisticated parties to make bad
bargains and even waive fundamental rights.6" Common examples of parties'
freedom of contract include contracting to waive the right to a jury trial or
511 (Mo. 2001) (White; J., concurring); see, e.g., Fina, Inc. v. ARCO, 16 F. Supp. 2d 716
(E.D. Tex. 1998), rev'd, 200 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2000); DwIGHT G. CONGER ET AL.,
CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT LITIGATION § 6:3 (1990).
61. Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 332.
62. Id. at 337.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 338 n.4.
65. See Malan Realty Investors Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo. 1997);
High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. 1992). In
Malan, the lessor filed petition for possession of a commercial retail property and for
breach of contract. Malan, 953 S.W.2d at 624. The lessee surrendered possession of the
property and filed an answer and counterclaim for breach of contract. Id. The defendant
lessee requested ajury trial and the plaintiff lessor filed a motion to enforce the jury trial
waiver in the lease. Id. The trial court enforced the waiver and entered judgment for the
lessor after a bench trial. Id. Considering the enforceabiltity of the waiver as the sole
issue on appeal, the court concluded that the right to a jury trial could be waived by
contract and that the lessee knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to aj ury trial. Id.
at 627-28. In High Life, an alcoholic beverage distributor brought a breach of contract
action against a wine cooler wholesaler for wrongful termination of a distribution
agreement. High Life Sales Co., 823 S.W.2d at 494. The wholesaler sought to enforce
a forum selection clause requiring legal action to be brought in Kentucky. Id. at 495. On
appeal, the court determined that forum selection clauses are enforceable unless unfair
or unreasonable. Id. at 497.
7
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agreeing to a forum selection clause.66 This freedom of contract also gives
sophisticated parties the ability to limit future remedies.67
. In considering the enforceability of a contract provision, the "character and
quality of negotiations are relevant in determining whether an agreement is an
adhesion contract."68 If this consideration demonstrates a contract created by
two sophisticated parties, "[c]ourts [will] enforce the objective terms of contracts
between [them], without regard to the parties' subjective intent." '69 Further, in
a contract between sophisticated businesses, "[t]he character and quality of
negotiations do not vary the terms of a written contract."7 Courts may also
refuse to enforce a provision if it fixes damages to disproportionate amounts and
works as a penalty.7 Finally, courts may consider ambiguity as a reason for
invalidating a liability limitation.72 The ambiguity of a liability limitation depends
upon the particular circumstances of the contract.73 To this end, "[1]anguage that
is ambiguous to an unsophisticated party may not be ambiguous to a
sophisticated commercial entity. '74 Nevertheless, in contracts between
sophisticated parties with purely economic damages at issue, courts rarely find
liability limitations unconscionable.75
66. See Malan, 953 S.W.2d at 627-28; High Life Sales Co., 823 S.W.2d at 497.
67. See Malan, 953 S.W.2d at 627-28; High Life Sales Co., 823 S.W.2d at 497;
Warner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 428 S.W.2d 596,601-02 (Mo. 1968); Liberty Fin.
Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial Processsing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40,49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
68. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505, 510
(Mo. 2001) (citing Peters v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 853 S.W.2d 300,301 (Mo. 1993)).
69. Id. (citing Emerick v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Mo.
1988)).
70. Id. (citing Craig v. Jo B. Gardner, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 316, 324 (Mo. 1979)).
71. See, e.g., Interthem, Inc. v. Structural Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.2d 64,66 (Mo. 1974);
Plymouth Sec. Co. v. Johnson, 335 S.W.2d 142, 152 (Mo. 1960).
72. See J.E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club, 491 S.W.2d 261, 264
(Mo. 1973).
73. See id.
74. Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 338 n.4 (Mo. 1996).
75. See RoyA. Elam Masonry, Inc. v. Fru-Con Constr. Corp., 922 S.W.2d 783,790
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996); World Entertainers, Inc. v. Midcoast Aviation Serv., Inc., 713
S.W.2d 606, 610-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Liberty Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial Data
Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40, 49-50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); cf Bracey v. Monsanto
Co., 823 S.W.2d 946, 948-50 (Mo. 1992).
In Monsanto, the court considered an unconscionability challenge to a purchase
contract provision limiting a farmer's recovery for crop damage against a herbicide
manufacturer to either the purchase price of the herbicide or replacement herbicide.
Monsanto, 823 S.W.2d at 947-50. The farmer claimed the limitation caused the warranty
provided in the contract to fail its essential purpose under the Missouri Uniform
Commercial Code, Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-719(2) (1986). The court determined the
unconscionability of the provision required consideration of Missouri Revised Statutes
[Vol. 68
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Principal Opinion
In Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., the Missouri
Supreme Court considered the enforceability of a liability limitation provision
in a contract between sophisticated parties.76 Purcell argued that the liability
limitation was unenforceable for five reasons." First, Purcell contended that the
liability limitation violated public policy." Second, Purcell argued that the
liability limitation was invalid as not "bargained for" and supported by its own
consideration.79 Third, Purcell asserted that no controversy existed at the time
of contract."0 Fourth, Purcell contended that the liability limitation constituted
an unlawful penalty for breach of contract.81 Finally, Purcell argued that the
ambiguous language of the limitation provision rendered it unenforceable.82
Before addressing each of Purcell's arguments, the court addressed the
sophistication of the parties.8 3 The court initially noted Purcell's position among
the top four commercial tire dealers in the country. 4 Further, the court noted
that Purcell's president, a former pilot, had participated in fifteen plane.
purchases and fourteen pre-purchase plane inspections prior to the transaction
in question." Turning to Beechcraft, the court recognized that, as a general
aviation business, it routinely performed pre-purchase inspections for plane
purchasers.86 In addition, Beechcraft offered more comprehensive inspections
(at additional cost) than the inspection contracted for in the instant case.87 For
Section 400.2-719(2) and (3) in conjunction. Subsection (3) states that "[c]onsequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.
Limitations of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitations of damages where the loss is
commercial is not." Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-719(3) (1986) (emphasis added). The court
did not, however, make a finding of unconscionability, but rather remanded the case to
the trial court to determine the issue of unconscionability. Monsanto, 823 S.W.2d at 950.
76. 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2001).
77. Id. at 509-11.
78. Id. at 509.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 510.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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all of these reasons, the court determined both Purcell and Beechcraft to be
sophisticated parties.88
After determining that the contract in question involved sophisticated
parties, the court addressed each of Purcell's contentions.8 9 First, Purcell argued
that the Alack decision required courts to strictly scrutinize tort liability
limitations because "[o]ur traditional notions of justice are so fault based that
most people might not expect them to be altered."9 The court's response also
cited Alack, noting that negligence liability limitations do not violate public
policy if they provide effective notice of the release." The court further pointed
out that the Alack court specifically reserved deciding the applicability of the
"express negligence" rule92 to sophisticated parties.93 The court consequently
found that enforcing the provision in the instant case did not violate public policy
because the language of the liability limitation constituted a "clear,
unambiguous, unmistakable" notice of the waiver "conspicuously located
directly above the signature."94
Finding no violation of public policy in the enforcement of the provision,
the court turned to Purcell's contention that the liability limitation was not
"bargained for" and supported by separate consideration as required by the
Weindel and Schaffer decisions.95 After reviewing precedent holding that the
written terms of a contract bind sophisticated parties,96 the court distinguished
the case before it from Weindel and Schaffer.97 The court distinguished Weindel
on the grounds that it involved an attempt by one party to add a liability
limitation after the parties had already reached an agreement, and thus
constituted an unenforceable unilateral amendment to the agreement.98 In
contrast, the liability limitation in Purcell formed part of the original
agreement. 99
Furthermore, in Schaffer, the court refused to enforce a liability limitation
in a form contract against an unsophisticated party because the provision failed
to give adequate notice of waiver due to the absence of the terms "negligence"
88. Id. at 509.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo.
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id.; see discussion supra Part III.C.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
93. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 509.
94. Id.
95. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 509; see supra Part III.B.
96. See supra Part III.D.
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or"fault."' 00 In the present case, however, the court concluded that sophisticated
party status deprived Purcell of the protection provided under Schaffer. 0'
The Purcell court then went further in its analysis of Weindel and
Schaffer. 2 The court stated that both of these cases preceded its decision in
Alack and the court abrogated the two cases to the extent that they suggested that
parties only agree to "bargained for" terms." 3 The court further rejected any
suggestion from these cases that the liability limitation required separate
consideration, finding adequate consideration for the liability limitation in
Purcell from the inspection agreement fee.04
Having rejected Purcell's separate negotiation and consideration arguments,
the court then considered Purcell's "controversy requirement" argument.'0 5
Purcell again relied on Weindel and Schaffer for the proposition that a
controversy must exist at the time of contracting for a liability limitation to be
enforceable. 6 The court rejected this argument again on the grounds that Alack
superseded Weindel and Schaffer and determined that future claims of negligence
can be waived by contract.0 7
After dismissing Purcell's controversy requirement argument, the court next
addressed Purcell's contention that the liability limitation constituted an
unconscionable penalty because it provided a disproportionately small recovery
by limiting damages to the inspection fee.0 8 The court responded that Missouri
precedent only invalidated provisions fixing damage amounts when such a
provision provided for "disproportionately large damages."'0 9 Moreover, the
court noted that in situations involving sophisticated parties andpurely economic
damages, courts rarely find liability limitations unconscionable, and the court
saw no justification for such a finding here. "0
Finally, the court addressed Purcell's attempt to invalidate the liability
limitation on the basis of ambiguity."' The court responded that "ambiguity
depends on context," and what may be ambiguous to an unsophisticated party is





104. Id. at 509-10.
105. Id. at 510; seesupra Part III.B.
106. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 510.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see supra Part IlI.D.
110. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 510; see supra Part III.D and text accompanying note
71.
111. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 510.
112. Id.; see supra Part III.C.
11
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must be interpreted in its entirety, and "[t]he contract as a whole limited
Beechcraft's liability." ' 3 The court emphasized the contract's explicit statement
that the inspection provided no warranties and that an inspection providing
warranties could be obtained at additional cost."4 Re-emphasizing the parties'
status as sophisticated parties to a commercial transaction, the court concluded
that no ambiguity existed.' ' Finding no basis for invalidating the liability
limitation, the court affirmed the district court's decision limiting Purcell's
recovery to the inspection fee." 6
B. The Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Judge White expressed his complete agreement
with the majority opinion." 7 He felt compelled, however, to write about the
factual differences between Purcell and Alack and the ramifications of the
Purcell decision on the "express negligence" rule. 8 Judge White asserted that
the current decision in no way disturbed the express negligence rule established
by Alack.' "'
According to Judge White, three factors in Purcell "significantly limit the
[c]ourt's holding."'20 To begin, Judge White observed that Purcell represented
the "textbook example of a sophisticated contractor."'' He continued by stating
that, as the majority opinion correctly noted, damage waivers between
sophisticated parties, such as those in Purcell, do not require as exacting a
standard as those that are to be enforced against a consumer. 22 Although
sufficient in the present case, Judge White stated his belief that the provision in
question would not satisfy the standard applicable to consumers like the Alack
plaintiff. 2
Next, Judge White asserted that, in addition to the difference presented by
the sophistication of the parties in the present case and Alack, the principal
opinion's reference to the Bracey v. Monsanto Co. decision"' suggested a muchstricter standard applies to personal injury claims, regardless of the parties'
113. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 510.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 510-11.
116. Id. at 51i.
117. Id. (White, J., concurring).
118. Id. (White, J., concurring).
119. Id. (White, J., concurring).
120. Id. (White, J., concurring).
121. Id. (White, J., concurring).
122. Id. (White, J., concurring).
123. Id. (White, J., concurring).
124. See supra Part IV and text accompanying note 71.
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sophistication. 2 ' According to Judge White, the nature of Purcell's
"negligence" claim constituted the dispositive factor in removing the case from
the scope of the Alack decision. 26 In essence, Purcell claimed nothing more than
Beechcraft's negligent performance of the inspection contracted for.'27 Judge
White, therefore, reasoned that the parties in the instant case failed to present,
and the court appropriately declined to address, the issue of whether or not the
claim actually resulted from a tort or breach of contract.'28 In the end, Judge
White considered this failure irrelevant because the liability limitation precluded
further analysis of this "narrowly drawn cause of action."' 29
In support of enforcing the limitation provision before the court, Judge
White also relied on the contract's text, which stated that "Beechcraft's 'liability
... under the agreement' shall be limited to the cost of the inspection."3'
Consequently, Judge White regarded the liability limitation as broad enough to
cover the specific claim presented by Purcell.' Judge White concluded that
Purcell's claim "undoubtedly arises 'under the agreement,' regardless of whether
it is formally considered a tort or contract liability."' Judge White further
reasoned that because the provision only limited liability "under the agreement,"
it represented a "much narrower provision than the provision at issue in
Alack."'33 In contrast to the provision at question here, the Alack limitation
purported to release the defendant from liability for personal injury claims
without limiting liability to a breach of the agreement itself.'34 The provision in
the instant case clearly and unequivocally stated that liability for a violation of
the contract was limited to the contract price. 1
3
Considering the factual differences between Alack and the present case,
Judge White reasoned that the principal opinion correctly determined that
Alack's "express negligence" rule did not prevent the enforcement of contracts
between sophisticated parties which limit future liability without explicitly
stating the terms "negligence" or "fault."' 36 As the majority opinion correctly
concluded, according to Judge White, the provision in question clearly and
unmistakably limited Beechcraft's liability under the contract.
137
125. Purcell, 59 S.W.3d at 511 (White, J., concurring).
126. Id. (White, J., concurring).
127. Id. (White, J., concurring).
128. Id. (White, J., concurring).
129. Id. (White, J., concurring).
130. Id. (White, J., concurring).
131. Id. (White, J., concurring).
132. Id. (White, J., concurring).
133. Id. (White, J., concurring).
134. Id. (White, J., concurring).
135. Id. (White, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 512 (White, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 511-12 (White, J., concurring).
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Judge White closed his concurrence with a note of caution: "[t]he court,
however, is not presented with, and does not decide the question of whether this
provision expressly, clearly and unmistakably disclaims liability for duties
imposed not by explicit agreement, but by the general principles of tort law."'3
Judge White consequently concluded by stating that the exception to the
"express negligence" rule provided in the current decision extended no further
than the specific factual circumstances presented in Purcell."9
V. COMMENT
Given the clear conclusion of Purcell that the express negligence rule does
not apply to sophisticated parties, what other guidance can parties such as Purcell
and Beechcraft take from this decision? To begin, the majority opinion clearly
indicates the court's analysis of this claim as a breach of contract action, despite
Purcell's attempt to color the claim in tort by asserting Beechcraft's "negligence"
in performing the contract. 4 ° Judge White's concurrence elaborated that the
issue of whether the claim presented sounded in tort or in contract was not
presented by the parties and, therefore, was appropriately not addressed by the
court.' 4' Judge White's concurrence, however, continued by stating that the
failure to address the nature of the claim proved irrelevant because of the
"narrowly drawn cause of action" presented. 42 Judge White supported this
conclusion by observing that Purcell's claim unquestionably arose "under the
agreement" between Purcell and Beechcraft.'43 Judge White further stated that
the court was "not presented with, and does not decide the question of whether
this provision expressly, clearly and unmistakably disclaims liability for duties
imposed not by explicit agreement, but by the general principles of tort law."'"
Considering the majority and concurring opinions together, only one logical
conclusion can be drawn: the court undoubtedly regarded this action as an action
in contract and not in tort. Upon recognizing the decision as one based strictly
on a breach of contract claim, it becomes apparent that the court simply followed
a well recognized legal principle: the so-called "economic loss rule" or, as some
courts now refer to it, the "independent injury rule."' 4
138. Id. at 512 (White, J., concurring).
139. Id. (White, J., concurring).
140. See supra Parts II and IV.A.
141. See supra Part IV.B.
142. See supra Part IV.B.
143. See supra Part IV.B.
144. See supra Part IV.B.
145. See Eastman Chem. Co. v. Niro, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 712, 716 n.2 (S.D. Tex.
2000) (finding the "independent injury doctrine" a more appropriate title than "economic
loss rule" because a "plaintiff standing in some contractual relationship with [a]
defendant may sometimes recover under a tort cause of action despite suffering
[Vol. 68
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Put succinctly, the economic loss rule states that "a party to a contract may
not pursue a claim in tort for solely economic losses unless the party breaching
the contract has committed a tort which is distinguishable from or independent
of the breach of contract."'' 46 Stated in a manner particularly applicable to the
case at hand, "[t]he economic loss rule prohibits a negligence claim when the
breach of duty is contractual and the harm incurred is the 'result of failure of the
purpose of the contract.'" 47 The imposition of tort liability requires a tort duty
existing "independent of the contract and without reference to the specific terms
of the contract."'' 41 Consequently, "[m]erely alleging that the breach of contract
duty arose from a lack of due care will not transform a simple breach of contract
into a tort."'1 4
9
The rationale of the rule rests on a recognition of the fundamentally
different notions of duty embodied in contract law and tort law.150 Tort law
exclusively from economic losses"). This Author prefers the term "independent duty
rule" because, as articulated further in the discussion following, the rule should focus on
the nature of the duty between the parties. The "economic loss rule" title implies a focus
on the nature of the injury, that is, personal harm or purely economic loss, instead of the
appropriate focus on the nature of the duty. The "independent injury rule" attempts to
clarify this misconception, yet the quote at the beginning of this footnote applying that
label also seems to prematurely focus on the nature of the injury in relation to the duty
rather than analyzing the duty between the parties before addressing the nature of the
harm suffered. The rest of the discussion, however, refers to the rule as the "economic
loss rule" for consistency with the terminology used by the authorities cited and to avoid
unnecessary confusion.
146. Medalie v. FSC Sec. Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
147. Loughridge v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 192 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182-83
(D. Colo. 2002) (quoting Town of Alma v. Azco Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1261 (Colo.
2000)).
148. Conway v. Pac. Univ., 924 P.2d 818, 822 (Or. 1996) (quoting Georgetown
Realty, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 7, 14 (Or. 1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
149. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists (Risk Mgmt. Servs.) v. AON
Reinsurance Agency, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 983, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting Sommer v.
Fed. Signal Corp., 583 N.Y.S.2d 957, 961 (N.Y. 1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original); see also Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec Inc., 241 F.3d
915, 919 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[E]ven skillful pleading does not transform the damages
sought into tort claims to make up for what hindsight shows was the lack [of sufficient
contracting].").
150. See 2314 Lincoln Park W. Condo. Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd.,
555 N.E.2d 346, 351 (111. 1990) ("It would appear that the concept of duty is at the heart
of the distinction drawn by the economic loss rule."). "The rationale of the economic
loss rule is that tort law is not intended to compensate parties for losses suffered as a
result of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement." Sun Co. (R & M) v. Badger
Design & Constructors, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 365, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting Palco
Linings, Inc. v. Pavex, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (M.D. Pa. 1990)) (internal quotation
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recognizes the duties imposed as the result of the relationship between parties as
members of society in general. 5 ' Contract law, on the other hand, recognizes
parties' ability to impose, define, and modify duties not on the basis of a
relationship as members of society in general, but within the scope of a
relationship created by an agreement between the parties. 15
2
Waivers, however, have been characterized as a hybrid of tort law and
contract law, stemming from the inevitable co-mingling of the right to contract
and the duty to take responsibility for one's actions.'53 This hybrid status has
proven problematic to both attorneys and judges faced with applying and
interpreting the economic loss rule in commercial litigation. 54 One common
refrain against the enforcement of waivers suggests they induce negligent or
intentional violations of duty.5 5 While such an objection reflects legitimate
public policy concerns, one must keep the fundamental difference between
contract duty and tort duty in mind. To this end, one court articulated the policy
behind the economic loss rule as follows:
Almost every breach of contract involves actions or inactions that can
be conceived of as a negligent or intentional act. If left unchecked, the
incessant tide of tort law would erode and eventually swallow contract
marks omitted).
151. Strum v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 15 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1994). "[T]ort law
prescribes duties governing one's conduct vis-a-vis the general public, contract law
enforces bargained-for obligations to a particular party." Tom Hughes Marine, Inc. v.
Am. Honda Motor Co., 219 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2000). "Tort duties are imposed
upon parties 'by the law itself, without regard to their consent to assume them,' whereas
'one need not enter into the obligation of a contract with another save by one's own free
will."' Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 1, at 4 (5th ed. 1984)).
152. Strum, 15 F.3d at 330. "[C]ontract law facilitates the right of societal
members to arrange their own relationships and enforce them in accordance with their
agreements." Tom Hughes Marine, Inc., 219 F.3d at 325 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 4 cmt. c (1965)).
153. See Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F. Supp. 472,474 (D. Colo.
1992) (citing Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Colo. 1989)).
154. See Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J. Loftus, Riding the Choppy Waters ofthe East
River: Economic Loss Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 260, 260-70 (1997) (noting
the uncertainty involving the application of the economic loss rule and commercial
litigation); Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate
Commercial Torts, 69-NOV FLA. B.J. 34,34-42 (1995) (noting confusion among lawyers
and judges about application of the economic loss rule in commercial litigation); Hon.
Sheldon Gardner & Mathew Sheynes, The Moorman Doctrine Today: A Look at Illinois'
Economic-Loss Rule, 89 ILL. B.J. 406, 406 (2001) (characterizing the expansion of the
economic loss rule beyond its original scope as "unsettling").
155. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 297 (1991).
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law. This court believes that if tort law and contract law are to fulfill
their distinctive purposes, they might be distinguished where it is
possible to do so. The economic loss doctrine serves the basis for such
a distinction." 6
The distinction, and thus the application of the rule, seems most appropriate
in cases like Purcell because "contract law ... is better suited than tort law for
dealing with purely economic loss in the commercial arena."'5 7 Particularly in
the context of a commercial transaction between sophisticated parties, contract
duties represent a commodity that can be exchanged, or altered, if the parties
intend to do so.' This ability reflects the core concept of contract law:
The very notion of contract is the consensual formation of
relationships with bargained-for duties. An essential corollary of the
concept of bargained-for duties is bargained-for liabilities for failure
to perform them. Important to the vitality of contract is the capacity
voluntarily to define the consequences of the breach of a duty before
the duty is assumed." 9
In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,' the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged the economic loss rule's function in
preserving parties' ability to define contractual duties by stating that parties may
contract to allocate risks by agreement without the special protections afforded
under tort law in order to recover damages resulting from a breach of contract.'6 '
The Washington Supreme Court further highlighted the utility of the rule when
it stated that "[a] bright line distinction between the remedies offered in contract
and tort with respect to economic damages also encourages parties to negotiate
toward the risk distribution that is desired or customary. [Application of the
156. Princess Cruises, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F. Supp. 151, 155 (E.D. Va.
1996); see also Hulse v. First Am. Title Co. of Crook County, 33 P.3d 122, 139 (Wyo.
2001) ("Tort law proceeds from a long historical evolution of externally imposed duties
and liabilities. Contract law proceeds from an even longer historical evolution of
bargained-for duties and liabilities. The careless and unnecessary blanket confusion of
tort and contract would undermine the carefully evolved utility of both.") (quoting Snyder
v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec Inc., 241 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 1995).
158. See Wendell H. Holmes, The Freedom Not to Contract, 60 TUL. L. REv. 751,
751-52 (1986).
159. Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 1999).
160. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
161. See id. at 871-74.
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economic loss rule] preserve[s] the incentive to adequately self-protect during the
bargaining process."'
' 62
The Purcell decision recognizes contract law's fundamental ability to
allocate risks in agreements between sophisticated parties.'63 The court plainly
regarded the case before it as one in which Purcell attempted to avoid the
consequences of an unfavorable allocation of risk. This treatment is particularly
evident in the court's emphasis on Purcell's sophistication and ability to contract
for a higher level of inspection service.'64 Although it did not explicitly say so,
the court appeared to follow the economic loss rule by deciding that Purcell's
claim, even characterized as one of negligence, arose only from the contractual
relationship between Purcell and Beechcraft. Beechcraft obviously had no
general duty as a member of society at large to perform pre-purchase inspections
of planes. Beechcraft's only duty to perform a pre-purchase plane inspection
arose from the specific contractual relationship created between it and Purcell by
virtue of their agreement.
Consequently, the Purcell court saw no reason to allow Purcell to gain
recovery in addition to that provided by the contract into which it voluntarily
entered. The decision correctly recognizes the inappropriateness of tort law
remedies in cases where sophisticated parties are free to allocate the risk of
economic loss through disclaimers or limitations of liabilities in a contract.'65
While there has been criticism of the application of the economic loss rule (and
such concerns have prompted the creation of exceptions in some
circumstances), 66 even those criticizing the rule would admit the propriety of its
application in a case such as Purcell.'67
162. Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 992
(Wash. 1994).
163. See supra Part III.D.
164. See supra Part IV.A.
165. See Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec Inc., 241 F.3d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 1995).
166. See Fox & Loftus, supra note 154, at 268-71 (noting some of the exceptions
to the economic loss rule); Schwiep, supra note 154, at 41-42 (advocating exceptions to
and the proper application of the economic loss rule); Gardner & Sheynes, supra note
156, at 408-11 (describing the exceptions to the economic loss rule).
167. Schwiep, supra note 154, at 42 ("Intentional tort claims that allege no more
than a breach of contractual obligations should be barred by the doctrine. This is because
plaintiffs pressing such a claim are protected ... by the contract. [In such cases the]
plaintiff's remedy [is] properly limited to those available under the contract. Defendant
did no more than breach its contract, albeit intentionally, and so it is to the contract that
a plaintiff must turn for its remedy. Incidentally, this is already the law of Florida (and
most jurisdictions)" (footnote omitted)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Purcell decision clearly establishes the inapplicability of the express
negligence rule to liability limitation provisions between sophisticated parties in
a commercial transaction. The court's opinion, however, failed to explicitly
address whether the claim presented was a contract or tort claim. Nevertheless,
the tone of the majority opinion and the concurrence of Judge White, considered
together, plainly indicated the court's view of the action before it as a pure matter
of contract law. The court clearly rejected Purcell's attempt to recover under a
tort claim simply by alleging a "negligent" breach of contract. As such, the
decision can simply be viewed as consistent with the well-known economic loss
rule. Whether explicitly adopting that doctrine or not, the Purcell decision
recognizes the doctrine's purpose in distinguishing the fundamental differences
between contract law and tort law. Consequently, the decision reaffirms the basic
contract principle of allowing parties with sufficient knowledge and ability to
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